Duns Scotus on Eternity and Timelessness by Cross, Richard
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 14 Issue 1 Article 1 
1-1-1997 
Duns Scotus on Eternity and Timelessness 
Richard Cross 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Cross, Richard (1997) "Duns Scotus on Eternity and Timelessness," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 14 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol14/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
DUNS SCOTUS ON ETERNITY AND TIMELESSNESS 
Richard Cross 
Scotus consistently holds that eternity is to be understood as timelessness. In 
his early Lectura, he criticizes Aquinas' account of eternity on the grounds 
that (1) it entails collapsing past and future into the present, and (2) it entails 
a B-theory of time, according to which past, present and future are all onto-
logically on a par with each other. Scotus later comes to accept something 
like Aquinas' account of God's timelessness and the B-theory of time which it 
entails. Scotus also offers a refutation of his earlier argument that Aquinas' 
account of eternity entails collapsing past and future into the present. 
In this paper, I want to establish two conclusions. The main one will be 
that Scotus has a conception of eternity as timelessness. For an entity to 
be timeless, I mean that it lacks both temporal extension and temporal 
succession. The second is that, despite the fact that in one early passage 
Scotus explicitly criticizes Aquinas, their positions are not as diverse as 
commentators have supposed. Both of these claims are against the 
received wisdom concerning Scotus' position, but I will try to give good 
reasons for accepting them. I shall first give an account of the Thomist 
claim which Scotus criticizes, together with Scotus' criticism. In the sec-
ond section of this paper, I shall outline Scotus' standard position on 
timelessness. In the third section I shall show that Scotus' position is 
very close to Aquinas'. In a final section, I will summarize my findings, 
and suggest two difficulties with Scotus' proposed account. I will also 
try to show what contemporary relevance Scotus' account might have.1 
Some textual considerations need to be borne in mind, since there 
seems to me to be some evidence that Scotus changed his mind on the 
matter, and came to see that his earlier position was inconsistent. In 
what follows, I shall make use of two different versions of Scotus' com-
mentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. The earlier of these is the 
Lectura, the relevant parts of which date from before 1300.2 My main 
source will be the Ordinatio: Scotus' final edited version of his commen-
tary. Dating this work is difficult. We know that Scotus was working 
on it as early as 1300, and that it remained incomplete at the time of his 
death in 1308.3 Nevertheless, we can reliably take it as the most impor-
tant version to survive. 
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I. Scotus' criticism of Aquinas in Lectura, book 1, distinction 39 
In a famous rassage inspired by Boethius, Aquinas claims that God 
can know future contingents since 
(A) All temporal things are eternally present to God: 
I would argue that (A) provides good evidence that Aquinas holds God 
to be timeless. Whether or not Aquinas did hold God to be timeless is 
still a matter for dispute, however, and I will not discuss it here.s There 
seem to me to be good reasons for supposing Aquinas' God to be time-
less, and I shall assume, for the purposes of my paper, that Aquinas has 
a conception of divine timelessness. However (A) is construed, it seems 
prima facie to be open to an objection which has been clearly articulated 
by Anthony Kenny: 
The whole concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is 
simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be radically inco-
herent. For simultaneity as ordinarily understood is a transitive 
relation. If A happens at the same time as B, and B happens at 
the same time as C, then A happens at the same time as C. If the 
BBC programme and the lTV programme both start when Big 
Ben strikes ten, then they both start at the same time. But, on St 
Thomas' view, my typing of this paper is simultaneous with the 
whole of eternity. Again, on his view, the great fire of Rome is 
simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type 
these very words, Nero fiddles heartlessly on.6 
Although he does not point this out, Kenny's inference here will only be 
valid if simultaneity is both transitive and symmetrical. Presumably, 
Kenny would regard the symmetry of a relation of simultaneity to be so 
obvious as not to need spelling out. 
William Lane Craig has raised a weaker related objection to Aquinas' 
account. Craig argues, on the basis of his account of God's knowledge, 
that Aquinas must be a "proponent of the B-theory of time," accepting 
that "the past, present, and future are all ontologically on a par with 
each other."7 Craig's point is rather different from Kenny's, since I take 
it that it would be possible to hold a B-theory of time without accepting 
that past and future will collapse into the present. 
In book 1, distinction 39 of the Lectura, Scotus criticizes Aquinas' 
claim (A). Unfortunately, Scotus' later Ordinatio remains incomplete at 
this point, and the scribe notes that Scotus left a blank space to fill in the 
discussion later - presumably when he had worked out what he want-
ed to say on the matter.8 To make up for this deficiency, the scribe 
copied another version of the relevant discussion, a version which the 
Vatican editors regard as at best only dubiously authentic - possibly 
reconstructed by a disciple of Scotus' from lost notebooks, but certainly 
not representing Scotus' last thoughts on the matter.9 Two of the argu-
ments Scotus uses in the Lectura are relevant here. (A'.n Accepting 
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(B) If x is present to y, then both x and yexist, 
and 
(C) It is not the case that the whole of flowing time exists, 
Scotus concludes that (A) is false.lO By "exist," Scotus must mean some-
thing like "exist now," or "be present." He makes this clear by contrast-
ing the sense of "exist" he has in mind with "merely secundum quid exis-
tence": existence qualified in some way or another. To spell out the rele-
vant qualification, Scotus draws an analogy with space. God cannot be 
present to a place which exists merely potentially; neither can he be pre-
sent to a time (the future) which exists merely potentially.l1 Granted 
this, we can replace (B) and (C) with 
(B*) If x is present to y, then both x and yare present, 
and 
(C*) It is not the case that the whole of flowing time is present. 
The argument is that (A) will entail the falsity of (C*): and I take it that 
the falsity of (C*) would in turn entail 
(1) All things are temporally present, 
which in turn entails that all temporal things are simultaneous. (Scotus' 
second argument - [A'.21 - provides a good reason for rejecting [1].) 
Thus, (A'.!) is just a less rigorous variation of Kenny's argument against 
Aquinas, and anyone accepting (A'.I) will be committed to the transitiv-
ity and symmetry of relations of simultaneity or presence.12 
(A' .2) (A) entails 
(1 *) All things are actual. 
But Scotus holds that 
(D) Only temporally present things are actual, 
and hence that (A) entails 
(1) All things are temporally present. 
But (1) is false, since coupled with 
(E) What is actual at one time cannot be produced in actuality 
for the first time at a later time, 
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it entails the absurd conclusion 
(2) Nothing will be produced in actuality in the future. 
Therefore 0), and hence (A), are to be rejected.13 The significant point 
here is that rejecting (D) - as Aquinas will have to - will entail holding 
a B-theory of time: and accepting (D) will entail rejecting a B-theory of 
time. Much the same point is made by Marilyn Adams: 
Aquinas is presupposing an ontology according to which every-
thing that has any temporal location is timelessly given "in its own 
determinate existence," so that there is no difference in ontological 
status among past, present, and future things .... In advancing 
premiss 2 [i.e., (D)], Scotus is implicitly rejecting such an ontology 
in favor of one in which only the timeless and those temporal 
things that are temporally present are absolutely actual.14 
Thus, Scotus' two arguments provide two different reasons for the 
rejection of Aquinas' position. (A'.l) trades on the transitivity and sym-
metry of relations of simultaneity. It thus rejects the Thomist entailment, 
pointed out by Kenny, that past, present and future are all simultaneous. 
(A'.2) exploits the claim made in (0), and rejects the B-theory of time 
entailed by Aquinas' theory. William Lane Craig suggests further that 
(A'.l) entails that 
God is eternal only in that He is everlasting and exists at every 
temporal "now."IS 
I do not see just how (A'.I) entails the claim that God is everlasting, 
though I think I see how drawing this inference would be tempting. For 
example, we might draw this inference if we thought that the falsity of 
(A) entailed that God is successively present to successive temporal 
items. But I do not see that the falsity of (A) entails this: and, as we shall 
see, Scotus clearly denies elsewhere that God is successively present to 
successive temporal items. In what follows I shall try to show that there 
is plenty of evidence against the claim that Scotus' God is eternal in the 
sense of being everlasting. 
On the showing in book 1, distinction 39 of the Lectura, Scotus clearly 
rejects the Thomist position: though the account leaves unclear whether 
or not Scotus would hold God to be timeless. But elsewhere in both the 
Lectura and the Ordinatio, Scotus makes claims which are far more akin 
to the Thomist view which he rejects in book 1, distinction 39 of the 
Lectura. As I have already noted, Scotus' Ordinatio lacks distinction 39 of 
book 1: this lack seems to me to be initial evidence that Scotus came to 
perceive that his rejection of the Thomist position in the Lectura is incon-
sistent with other claims which he makes in the Lectura, and which -
since he repeats them in the Ordinatio - he clearly does not wish to 
abandon. In what follows, I shall argue that Scotus accepts the Thomist 
position with regard to timelessness, despite his rogue arguments in 
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book I, distinction 39 of the Lectura. I shall refer to "5cotus' standard 
position" to indicate the position taken everywhere except book I, dis-
tinction 39 of the Lectura. There is good evidence that Scotus rejects 
(A'.l) and (A'.2) in the Ordinatio, and that he should have rejected them 
even in the Lectura. As we shall see, Scot us' rejection of (A'.l) does not 
entail a commitment to the falsity of (C*). Equally, rejecting (A'.2) 
allows him to accept Aquinas' claim (or something like it) that God can 
have knowledge of his creatures in their actual existence, irrespective of 
whether those creatures are now future. 1o But I shall also argue that the 
way in which Scotus rejects (A'.2) will commit him to a B-theory of time. 
We should also bear in mind, however, that Scotus says a great deal 
about time which falls outside the parameters of his discussion of eterni-
ty. I hope to explore in a later paper some of what Scotus says expressly 
about time. Briefly, it seems to me that Scotus has an account of time in 
which the B-series is fundamental. His account clearly allows a place for 
A-series time, and he does not regard the past, present and future as in 
every sense "on a par with each other." But he has difficulty spelling 
out just what his account of the A-series will be, since he consistently 
rejects any attempt to give an account of the A-series in terms of a flow-
ing "now."!7 
II. Scotus' position on etem ity and timelessness 
In his most important discussion of eternity, Scotus quotes with 
approval the well-known Boethian definition: 
Eternity is endless life, possessed perfectly and all at once.!B 
On this definition, as construed by 5cotus, eternity has, topologically, 
the properties of an instant. Like an instant, it is "all at once," 19 a proper-
ty which 5cotus takes as excluding temporal succession.20 Scotus is 
rightly quite clear that an instant has zero temporal extension. 21 Scotus 
does not suppose, however, that eternity is in every respect like a tem-
poral instant. Unlike an instant, it does not cease immediately: but this, I 
take it, is not to ascribe some topological property to eternity, since the 
point which Scotus wishes to make is that eternity is not the boundary of 
some temporally extended continuum. To underscore this point, Scotus 
talks of the "now" of eternity "remaining,"n having "duration"23 and, in 
Boethian fashion, being "endless."24 But this again would not be taken 
by Scotus to have any topological implications. Specifically, Scotus is 
quite clear that time is a continuum which is necessarily bounded by 
instants: and an enduring eternal "now" will fail to satisfy this condition 
for temporality.25 
It might be objected that Scotus is merely using language from an 
established Boethian and neo-Platonic tradition here, without the use of 
this language implying that Scotus really thinks that God is timeless. 
After all, he clearly holds that eternity has duration: and at one point he 
refers to it as "endless duration."26 In reply, I would offer three argu-
ments. First, Scotus has a clear conception of the topological differences 
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between an instant and a temporal continuum, and that it is reasonable 
to suppose that he has these differences in mind when likening eternity 
to an instant. 
Secondly, my claim that Scotus conceives of eternity as timelessness is 
strengthened by the way in which Scotus deals with two problems: (i) 
Does God's timeless willing of some effect entail that the effect is time-
less? (ii) Did God have to wait for the creation of the universe? With 
regard to the first of these questions, Scotus argues as follows: 
A new effect can be made by an old act of the will without a 
change of will. Just as I, by means of my continuous volition by 
which I will something to be done, will then do it just for the 
"when" for which I will to do it, so God in eternity willed some-
thing other than himself to be for some time and then created it 
for the "when" for which he willed it to be.27 
Equally, the fact that a creature is created at t does not entail that God 
has to do anything at t. All God has to do is to will (eternally) that the 
creature is created at t. Thus, there can be a new effect without any 
change in the cause.2B 
This account, although suggestive of my point, is admittedly consis-
tent both with a timeless God and with an immutable everlasting God. 
But Scotus' treatment of the second question is not. According to Scot us, 
God did not have to wait for the creation of the universe. First, God did 
not have to wait before deciding to create the universe. Thus, he did not 
wait and then start willing something. The reason for this is that God's 
willing is timeless. But more important is Scotus' assertion that God did 
not have to wait for the effect: 
[God's] will is not impotent; neither does it have existence in 
time, such that it would wait for the time for which it produces 
what it wills. It does not will this [willed thing] then to exist 
necessarily when it wills. Rather, it wills [it] to exist for some 
determined time - for which, however, it does not wait, since 
the operation of [God's] will is not in time.29 
Not having to wait for any effect - whatever the effect's temporalloca-
tion - entails being timeless. 
Thirdly, Scotus clearly holds that time is necessarily relative to 
change: if there were no change, there would be no time.3D Scotus makes 
this point as though merely metrical considerations were at stake: if 
there were no natural processes, then we would not be able to assign a 
measurable duration to any existing state of affairs. Richard Swinburne 
has pointed out that such a claim does not entail the further claim that, if 
there were no natural processes, there would be no temporal extension 
at all. On Swinburne's account, there could be temporal extension but 
no measurable duration. 31 Scotus' account, however, is not quite like 
this: and it is clear that Scotus would regard his account of time as hav-
ing topological implications, despite the (Aristotelian) way in which he 
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phrases the point. As just noted, temporal extension is defined by 
Scotus as a linear continuum bounded by instants. Independent of ques-
tions of metric, it is for Scotus a necessary feature of temporal extension 
that it have such a topology. Scotus' eternity, however, fails to satisfy 
this topological description. When he claims that time is the measure of 
change, and that time is necessarily relative to change, I therefore take it 
that he is denying any kind of Newtonian absolute time. Scotus is 
claiming that, in the absence of any change whatsoever, there would be 
nothing which exhibited any of the topological properties of time. (It 
will of course follow as a matter of fact on this account that there is no 
temporal topology without a temporal metric, granted that the existence 
of natural processes is a sufficient condition for the existence of a tempo-
ral metric.)32 
This third point is important for Scotus' account of God's eternity. 
Scotus argues that, for any item x, if x is to be temporal, then it must sat-
isfy one of two conditions: either (i) x is undergoing some real change; or 
(ii) x has the capacity for undergoing some real change.33 God can satis-
fy neither of these two conditions. God's simplicity entails that God 
cannot undergo any substantial or accidental change. Such change 
requires that the subject receive a new form: and it is not possible for a 
wholly simple being to receive a form. Furthermore, God's necessity 
entails that he cannot be annihilated.34 Since these two cases cover all the 
possibilities for change, Scotus infers that God is immutable: and hence a 
fortiori unable to satisfy (i) and (ii). 
Scotus' position here is open to an objection which I think he can suc-
cessfully rebut. To understand the objection, we will need an under-
standing of Scotus' account of relations. Roughly, Scotus adopts a realist 
account of real relations, such that the following principle is true: 
(F) For any item x and any item y, x is contingently really related 
to y, if and only if a relational property R, really distinct from x 
and y, inheres in X.3S 
Scotus' understanding of accidental properties in general is that they are 
properly classified as individual items (res), really distinct from the sub-
stance in which they inhere: and as Scotus understands a relational 
property, it too is classified as an individual item, really distinct from the 
substance in which it inheres. On this account of relations, it will look as 
though God could change - and thus be temporal- merely in virtue of 
changes in the relations holding between him and creatures. 
Scotus replies that God fails to be really related to any of his crea-
tures. God is merely rationally related to his creatures: even though his 
creatures are really related - in the relevant respects - to God. A ratio-
nal relation satisfies the following condition: 
(G) For any item x and any item y, x is rationally related to y, if 
and only if (a) at least one of x and y is really related to the other 
term, and (b) an intellectual agent cognizes this real relation.36 
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(G) allows that x could be rationally related to y, even if x is not really 
related to y. On (G), y's real relation - call it "R" - to x, together with 
an intellectual agent's cognition of R, would be jointly sufficient for x's 
being rationally related to y. There is thus a subclass of rational rela-
tions, which we could conveniently label "merely rational" relations: 
(G*) For any item x and any item y, x is merely rationally related 
to y, if and only if (a) y is really related to x, (b) it is not the case 
that x is really related to y, and (c) an intellectual agent cognizes 
the real relation between y and X. 37 
Of course, no item could simultaneously satisfy in exactly the same 
respect the conditions governing x in both (F) and (G*). 
Scotus argues that God instantiates the conditions governing x in 
(G*). He reasons that there can be no real relation in God to any other 
being: 
(H) Nothing in God requires the existence of some item other 
than God for its existence; 
(I) A real relation requires some item other than itself for its 
existence; 
therefore 
(3) There is no real relation in God to any item other than God. 3D 
(3) alone, however, is not sufficient to show that God can satisfy condi-
tions (a) and (c) of (G*), required for a merely rational relation. But 
Scotus would claim that condition (a) is satisfied in virtue of the fact that 
every creature is necessarily really related to its creator/9 and condition 
(c) is satisfied if either God or some other intellectual agent cognizes any 
one of the real relations holding between a creature and its creator.4D 
Since Scotus accepts (3), he has no trouble accepting that there can be 
real, temporally successive relations between creatures and God, with-
out this entailing that there are such real temporally successive relations 
between God and creatures. Thus, creatures can be changed such that 
there is no corresponding real (relational or non-relational) change in 
God. Scotus therefore affirms 
(4) There are no real temporally successive relations in God to 
any other item, 
which he claims is entailed by (3).41 As I will make clear in the final section 
of this paper, Scotus' acceptance of (3) leads to certain difficulties in his 
account. Accepting (4), however, is wholly unproblematic as far as I can 
see, and it is all that Scotus needs to block the objection that God could be 
temporal merely in virtue of his changing relations to his creatures. 
Scotus' acceptance of (3) does not, however, commit him to the posi-
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tion that God cannot undergo what a modern philosopher would label a 
"merely Cambridge" change: one such that different predicates can be 
true of an item at different times, even if that item is in every other respect 
unchangingY (Scotus would want to clarify: unchanging with regard 
both to non-relational features and real relational properties.) God 
could undergo a merely Cambridge change just if the following two con-
ditions are satisfied: (a) there is a change in a creature in any respect in 
which the creature is really related to God, and (b) some intellectual 
agent cognizes this change. Scotus is quick to point out that there is no 
difficulty in God's undergoing such changes, if it is the case that the real 
relation in a creature to God is cognized by a created (and not an uncre-
ated) intellect.43 Scotus' reason is that such changes will correspond to 
nothing whatever that is really in God. They are changes pertaining 
merely to our cognition of the real relations holding between some crea-
ture and God. In an important passage, Scotus puts the point as follows: 
"God begot [his Son]" consignifies the "now" of eternity, such 
that the sense is "God has the act of generation in the 'now' of 
eternity in so far as that 'now' coexisted with the past"; and 
"God begets" means "has the act of generation in the 'now' of 
eternity in so far as it coexists with the present." Thus, since the 
"now" [of eternity] truly coexists with any difference of time, we 
can truly predicate of God the differences of all times. 44 
When we refer to God using tensed propositions, then, we are drawing 
attention to the fact that the proposition "God exists" (tenseless) is 
always true. But we are not committed to holding that God is in any 
way temporal. On the account, present becomes past, and real relations 
in creatures to God come into existence and pass out of existence, with 
no corresponding real change in God. 
I have tried to show in this section that Scotus holds that God is time-
less in virtue of failing to satisfy either of temporality conditions (0 and 
(ii) given on p. 9 above, where timelessness entails lacking both tempo-
ral extension and succession. I therefore reject Craig's claim that Scotus 
construes "eternal" to mean merely "everlasting." In the next section, I 
will try to show that Scotus' standard position on timelessness is very 
similar to the Thomist account, and that Scotus' standard position is 
inconsistent with both (A'.l) and (A'.2). 
III. The rejection of (A'.I) and (A'.2) in Scotus' standard account 
Granted that Scotus' God is timeless, we can sensibly raise two rele-
vant questions about his account: (i) Does God's timelessness, as con-
strued by Scotus, entail collapsing past and future into the present? (ij) 
Does God's timelessness, as construed by Scotus, entail a B-theory of 
time? I will argue that Scotus' standard account of divine timelessness 
allows him to give a negative answer to the first of these questions, but 
not to the second. 
In book I, distinction 13 of both the Lectura and the Ordinatio, Scotus 
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considers an objection to timelessness which looks remarkably like his 
own (A'.l): 
When two things are compared to a third ... their union to each 
other follows from their union in the third thing .... I am with 
eternity, and Abraham was with eternity. Therefore I am simul-
taneous with Abraham.4s 
Scotus argues that the premisses do not entail the conclusion, on the 
grounds that the first premiss, which entails the transitivity and symme-
try of simultaneity, is untrue if the third relatum is limitless.'6 And the 
discussion above has made it clear that, according to Scotus, eternity 
instantiates limitlessness. In employing this argument, Scotus effective-
ly rejects his own (A'.I) against Aquinas. Specifically, he would reject 
the crucial 
(B*) If x is present to y, then both x and yare present. 
(The relation of being "present to" in [B*] means that the presence of tl 
and t2 to God, or God's simultaneity with them, will entail that tl and tz 
are simultaneous. Hence my conclusion that Scotus' argument here 
entails rejecting [B*].) Thus, Scotus standardly accepts Aquinas's 
(A) All temporal things are eternally present to God, 
but rejects (B*). Now, if Scotus rejects (B*), he will have a plausible way 
of blocking the inference from (A) to the rejection of 
(C*) It is not the case that the whole of flowing time is present. 
This amounts to the claim that, even if we accept (A), we do not need to 
accept the contradictory of (C*), 
(1) All things are temporally present. 
We might summarize this account by claiming that all temporal things are 
present to eternity without it following that they are temporally present. 
Scotus' solution, which is that God's limitlessness prevents Scotus' 
being simultaneous with Abraham, has some similarity with the most 
famous modern attempt to sidestep (A/.I): Stump and Kretzmann's ET-
simultaneity.47 ET-simultaneity is the kind of relation of simultaneity 
which obtains between two items such that one is eternal and the other 
is temporal. ET-simultaneity is a different kind of relation from the ordi-
nary kind of simultaneity which obtains between two temporal items 
(labeled by Stump and Kretzmann "T-simultaneity"):48 thus, on Stump 
and Kretzmann's account, the ET-simultaneity of both Abraham and 
Scotus with God will not entail that Abraham and Scotus are T-simulta-
neous. It is not clear to me just what ET -simultaneity amounts to: but 
the crucial analogy with Scotus' position is that on both positions God's 
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eternity is sufficient to block the inference from the simultaneity of all 
temporal items with God to the simultaneity of all temporal items with 
each other. Scotus' argument here offers some kind of way for both him 
and Aquinas to block (A'.t). Offering this way, I take it, means that 
Scotus' position represents a small improvement on the Thomist 
account. 
In his standard account, then, Scotus rejects (A'.I). Since Scotus' 
rejection of (A'.I) entails rejecting (1), Scotus' standard account also 
means, unsurprisingly, that he reject (A'.2). According to (A'.2), the fal-
sity of (1) will entail the falsity of (A). Scotus' standard account, howev-
er, both rejects (1) and retains (A). We can see how Scotus rejects (A'.2) 
if we look at what he has to say about God's knowledge of future events. 
Scotus sets up the problem by looking at the following scenario. 
Suppose some rational relation exists in God to his creatures in virtue of 
the divine intellect's cognition of the real relations between creatures 
and God. Since these real relations are, as a matter of contingent fact, 
constantly changing as creatures come into existence and pass out of 
existence, will it not be the case that God's knowledge of his creatures is 
always changing? Scotus argues that it will not: 
Just as [God] in eternity compares his will "as creative" to the 
soul of the Antichrist as possible for some time, so he in eternity 
compares his will "as creating" to the soul of the Antichrist as 
actually existing at that instant for which he wills to create that 
soul. And these are two rational relations. 49 
Before providing an assessment of the claims made in this passage, it is 
worth looking a little more closely at Scotus' account of God's knowl-
edge of his creatures. Basically, Scotus argues that God's knowledge of 
a creature will involve a real relation in the creature to God, and a mere-
ly rational relation in God to the creature. The rational relation in God is 
described by Scotus as God's comparing himself in some way to the cog-
nized creature.50 Now, on this showing it is quite clear that the passage 
just quoted will entail that God has timeless knowledge of future events 
in their actual existence, and that God can compare himself to these 
future events. The important point in this account is that there is a 
meaningful sense in which future events and substances have actual 
existence. 
In the passage, Scotus claims that God has two separate divinely 
caused rational relations, one corresponding to the Antichrist as actually 
existing at t, and another corresponding to the Antichrist as potentially 
existing at t -n. Scotus makes much the same point in a (failed) attempt to 
deal with the problem of God's knowledge of temporal indexicals: 
God can know himself to be creating a stone at [a time] a; but he 
cannot have any new knowledge that he is creating the stone. 
Rather, he knows in eternity that he creates the stone at a, just as 
he knows in eternity that, for some time, he is creative of a 
stone. In other words, he knows in eternity his actual relation to 
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[the stone] at a, just as he also knows his quasi-potential rational 
relation to [the stone] at some [other] time.51 
In this passage, God's actual relation to the stone at t is, of course, a 
rational relation. (The relevant term contradictory to "actual" here is 
"quasi-potential," not "rational," as the passage makes clear.) Again, 
the point is that God can have timeless knowledge of his essence com-
pared to some creature in its actual existence, whether or not that crea-
ture is now future. 
Scotus invests some importance in his claim that God must have two 
separate timeless rational relations to his creatures: an actual rational 
relation to the creature as actually existent, and a "quasi-potential" ratio-
nal relation to the creature considered as a future existent.52 Accepting 
(J) Divinely caused rational relations in God to a creature neces-
sarily correspond on a one to one basis with real relations 
between creatures and God, 
Scotus reasons that, if God does not have two such separate rational 
relations, then there cannot be two distinct real relations in the creature 
to God: one at tn of being created in the future, and one at t of being 
actually created. But if there are not two such distinct real relations, 
Scotus reasons, then there can be no new real relations between a crea-
ture and God.53 Presumably, Scotus is imagining that, on the proposed 
scenario, there would be no way of building a tense component into the 
actual existence of some item. Thus, for example, Scotus wants to claim 
that, unless there exists in the Antichrist both (i) a real relation at tn to 
God of being created in the future, and (ii) a real relation at t to God of 
being actually created, then it will not be possible to claim that the 
Antichrist exists at t, but not at t _n. 54 It is admittedly difficult to see why 
this should be so. But the important point to note is that, on this 
account, God can have a timeless rational relation to a creature in its 
actual existence (by comparing his essence to that creature in its actual 
existence), even if, like the Antichrist, the existence of such a creature is 
now future. 55 Thus, Scotus accepts: 
(K) For any creature c, God can have a timeless rational relation 
to c in its actual existence at t, 
(supposing as a matter of contingent fact that c begins to exist at t). But 
the discussion makes it clear that Scotus also accepts the related principle 
(L) For any creature c, God can have a timeless rational relation 
to c in its potential existence at t -n 
(again supposing as a matter of contingent fact that c begins to exist at t). 
(K) and (L) are not contradictories, because of the temporal component 
built in to the existence of c. (K) entails the falsity of 
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(0) Only temporally present things are actual, 
which Scotus should therefore replace with 
(0') It is timelessly the case that all things, past, present and 
future, are actual. 
(L) entails that Scotus also accept 
(L *) It is timelessly the case that all things, past, present and 
future, are potential. 
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(0') and (L *) are not contradictories, since implicit in each, as understood by 
Scotus, is a different set of temporal components. For example, the follow-
ing principle is true on this account, and consistent with both (0') and (L *): 
(0*) It is timelessly the case that (i) the past is potential at to and 
actual at h, (ii) the present is potential at to and tl, and actual at h, 
and (iii) the future is potential at to, tJ and h, and actual at h 
(where to is earlier than tl, h is earlier than t2, and tz is earlier than to). 
(0*) brings out a clear distinction which Scotus makes between actuality 
and temporal presence: an item can be actual without being (now) pre-
sent. I will return to this distinction in my conclusion. 
This discussion allows us to provide the positive answer to our sec-
ond question, Does God's timelessness, as construed by Scotus, entail a 
B-theory of time? On a B-theory of time, past, present and future are all 
ontologically on a par with each other. The ontological parity of past, 
present and future is clearly suggested by (0*), which is entailed by (K) 
and (L) on Scotus' understanding. According to (0*), past, present and 
future are all actual in just the same respect, and potential in just the 
same respect. Scotus is therefore committed to a B-theory of time. Since 
he rejects (0), he will clearly have to abandon (A'.2). But (K) allows 
Scotus to adopt something like Aquinas' position on God's knowledge 
of creatures in their actual existence, even if those creatures are now 
future. Thus (K) does not mean that God's knowledge of his creatures in 
their actual existence entails that they are all, irrespective of their tempo-
rallocation, now present. Scotus' rejection of (A'.2) is therefore wholly 
consistent with his rejection of (A'.1). 
Scotus' preferred account of God's presence to his creatures is spelled 
out in terms of coexistence. God coexists with his (temporal) creatures. 
The relation, as Scotus crucially points out, is merely rationaP6 As such, 
it is not properly transitive or symmetrical at all. The reason for this is 
that a merely rational relation between God and a creature c requires 
both that c is really related to God, and that God is not really related to c. 
It thus does not entail rejecting (C*), or accepting (1). Let me quote in 
full a passage part of which I quoted above: 
What do these temporally diverse words signify when we predi-
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cate them of God? I reply that they can be more properly said to 
consignify the "now" of eternity than differences of time. 
Neither [do they signify] that "now" absolutely, since then there 
would not be a variation in the diverse modes of signifying 
time. Rather, [they consignify the "now" of eternity] in so far as 
it coexists with the parts of time. For example, "God begot [his 
Son]" consignifies the "now" of eternity, such that the sense is 
"God has the act of generation in the 'now' of eternity in so far 
as that 'now' coexisted with the past"; and "God begets" means 
"has the act of generation in the 'now' of eternity in so far as it 
coexists with the present." Thus, since the "now" [of eternity] 
truly coexists with any difference of time, we can truly predicate 
of God the differences of all times. 57 
The passage makes it clear that there is real temporal succession in crea-
tures. But a timeless God coexists with his creatures just if it is the case 
both that there are real relations between creatures and God, and that 
there exist intellectual agents (e.g., God) actually cognizing these rela-
tions. This second condition is required to satisfy Scotus' claim, just 
noted, that coexistence is a merely rational relation. (God's own cogni-
tion is, as made clear above, timeless, entailing the actual existence 
[though not temporal presence] of the cognized real relations.) On this 
account, God coexists with his creatures just if it is the case that some 
intellectual agent cognizes the actual (though not necessarily temporally 
present) real relations between creatures and God. 
On the other hand, Scotus' concept of coexistence does not have the 
same explanatory value as that of presence or simultaneity. We can use 
the idea that all of time is present to God to explain how God can have 
knowledge of all of time: God can know all of time since all of time is 
present to him, or simultaneous with him. Scotus' concept of God's coex-
istence with his creatures cannot explain how God has knowledge of all 
of time. Granted that creatures have real relations to God, God coexists 
with creatures if and only if one of two conditions is satisfied: either (a) 
God compares his essence to these real relations, or (b) a created intellect 
compares God's essence to these real relations. But neither of these con-
ditions can possibly explain how God (or indeed a creature) is able to 
perform the relevant cognitive task. Perhaps Scotus should appeal to his 
standard argument against (A/.l), according to which all time is simulta-
neous with God, to explain how God can perform the relevant cognitive 
task. Indeed, his standard argument against (A' .1) will allow him to 
claim that only God can perform the relevant task with regard to past 
and future items, since only God has the relevant access (mediated via 
the simultaneity of all time to God) to past and future items. 
IV. Conclusion 
In section 2 of this paper, I attempted to argue against Craig that 
Scotus' God is timeless. In addition to showing that Scotus has a clear 
conception of divine timelessness, I tried to show what is distinctive in 
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his account. I tried to show that Scotus has a clear conception of the 
topological properties which timelessness will exhibit, and that central 
to Scotus' defense of God's timelessness is God's failure to be really 
related to any of his creatures. 
In section 3, I argued further that Scotus' rejection of Aquinas' 
account, in book I, distinction 39 of the Lectura, needs to be treated with 
caution, since there is good reason to suppose that in his standard 
account Scotus rejects the two Lectura arguments. He rejects (A'.1) since 
he rejects 
(B*) If x is present to y, then both x and yare present; 
and he rejects (A'.2) since he rejects 
(D) Only temporally present things are actual. 
Accepting (D') and (L *) in place of (D) will allow Scotus to affirm that 
future existents can be known in their actual existence: though at the 
expense of committing Scotus to a B-theory of time. I thus reject Adams' 
claim, made on the basis of (A'.2), that Scotus' ontology of time avoids 
his being a B-theorist. But Scotus still consistently rejects 
(1) All things are temporally present. 
Thus, his commitment to a B-theory of time does not entail collapsing 
the past and future into the present. 
This does not mean, of course, that there are not problems with the 
account, even in terms of its internal coherence. Crucially, there seem to 
me to be two related difficulties which Scotus does not overcome. The 
first is his clear commitment to the claim that God's knowledge of his 
creatures according to their actual existence fails to be a real relation in 
God. We would normally think of x's knowledge of y as involving at 
least a relation in x (howsoever a relation is conceived). Scotus, indeed, 
standardly agrees with this description of knowledge. 58 Thus, I do not 
see how God could have knowledge of his creatures without thereby 
being really related to them. 
Scotus' reason for denying that God, in cognizing his creatures, is 
really related to them is that he accepts the general principle 
(H) Nothing in God requires the existence of some item other 
than God for its existence. 
But accepting (H) seems to me to lead to a second problem in Scotus' 
account. The problem is that for God to have knowledge of his actually 
existing creatures, it is necessary that his creatures actually exist (though 
not, of course, that they actually exist now). Thus, the actual existence of 
his creatures is a necessary condition for God's having knowledge of 
them.59 And this violates (H). How important this will be for us will 
depend on the strength of our commitment to (H). But (H) is clearly 
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important for Scotus. Since, as Scotus construes relations, it is the case that 
(M) Any item requiring the existence of some item other than 
itself is either (a) a real relation, or (b) really (though not formal-
ly) identical with a real relation/o 
the falsity of (H), entailed by the account of God's knowledge which I 
have just outlined, will entail that Scotus' central claim 
(3) There is no real relation in God to any item other than God 
is false. It is for this reason that I regard Scotus' acceptance of (3) as 
problematic. But the truth of (3) is not necessary for the truth of 
(4) There are no real temporally successive relations between 
God and his creatures, 
since a God really related to his creatures in a certain respect (e.g., 
knowledge) need not satisfy either of the temporality conditions (i) or 
(ii) outlined in section 2 of this paper. Equally, the benefits of abandon-
ing (H), and hence (3), easily outweigh the sacrifices which have to be 
made by retaining it. I would judge, then, that Scotus should abandon 
both of these claims. 
Does Scotus' account have anything to offer to us today? I would argue 
that it appears to be a fairly clear account of timelessness, and that it is per-
haps the earliest account to provide a suitable reply to the kind of objection 
found to Aquinas' (and Scotus' standard) account in both Kenny and Scotus' 
own (A'.I). As we find the account of timelessness in Scotus, it depends on 
Scotus' acceptance of (3), a proposition which many today would find unap-
pealing. But if we adopt the modifications to Scotus' account proposed in 
the final section of my paper, the account will no longer entail (3), since on 
my proposed modifications what is at issue is just God's knowledge of his 
creatures: and we can have an account of such knowledge independent of 
our acceptance or rejection of (3). To allow for timelessness, all we need to 
posit is that God's knowledge is changeless: not that God has no real proper-
ties contingent upon the existence of his creatures. 
Scotus' distinction between actuality and temporal presence (such 
that past and future can be actual without this entailing that they are 
now present) has a parallel in a suggestion made by a modern philoso-
pher, which indicates that it·might still have some mileage in it. 
Aristotle's first argument in favor of the claim that time "does not exist 
at all, or hardly and obscurely,"M is that time is composed of merely past 
and future, where the past has been and gone (and hence does not exist), 
and the future is still to be (and hence does not exist).62 Richard Sorabji 
suggests the following response to the argument: 
It is only in the irrelevant sense of being present that the past and 
future do not exist. In the sense that matters, there is a past and 
there is a future, and so there is time. 63 
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In this response, Sorabji apparently capitalizes on a distinction between 
existence and presence which bears a striking resemblance to Scotus' 
contrast between actuality and temporal presence. This distinction 
allows Scotus' B-theory of time to avoid collapsing past and future into 
the present. Equally, his standard objection to (A'.l) is a striking antici-
pation of Stump and Kretzmann's ET-simultaneity, and provides I think 
a good example of Scotus' insight into a perennial and engaging prob-
lem in the philosophy of religion - whatever we might think of his (and 
Stump and Kretzmann's) proposed replies. 
Oriel College, Oxford 
NOTES 
1. I refer to the following works of Scotus: Lectura (= Lect.), in Opera 
Omnia, ed. C. Balie and others (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 1950-), vols 16-
19; Ordinatio (= Ord.), in Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balie and others, vols 1-7; 
Quaestiones Quodlibetales (= Quod.), in Opera Omnia, ed. Luke Wadding, 12 
vols (Lyons: Durand, 1639). I refer to the following work of Boethius: De 
Consolatione Philosophiae (= Cons.), ed. Ludwig Bieler, Corpus Christianorum 
Series Latina, 94 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1957); to the following work of 
Aquinas: Summa Theologiae (= Sum. Theo!.), ed. Petrus Caramello, 3 vols 
(Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1952-56); and to the following work of Henry of 
Ghent: Quodlibet 9 (= Quod. 9), in Opera Omnia, vol. 13, ed. R. Macken 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1982). 
2. On the date of the first book of the Lectura, see C. Balie, Les commen-
taires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences, Bibliotheque de la 
Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, 1 (Louvain: Bureaux de la Revue, 1927), p. 
86; also Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balie, 1:160*. 
3. For 1300, see Ord. prol. 2.un., n. 112 (1:77). 
4. "Omnia quae sunt in tempore sunt Deo ab aeterna presentia": Sum. 
Theo!. 1.14.13 (1:86b). 
5. On the issue, see conveniently Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas 
Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 103-09, who disputes the claim 
that Aquinas conceives of eternity as timelessness, against for example 
Christopher Hughes, On a Complex Theory of a Simple God. An Investigation in 
Aquinas' Philosophical Theology, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 114-20. 
6. "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," in Aquinas. A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony Kenny, Modern Studies in 
Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 264. 
7. William Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge of Future 
Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 7 
(Leiden: Brill, 1988), p. 118; for Craig's defense of the claim that Aquinas is a 
B-theorist, see pp. 116-118. 
8. See Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balie, 6:308. 
9. See Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balie, 6:26*-30*. The text (Ord. 1.39.1-5) is 
printed in an appendix in Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balie, 6:401-44. 
10. Lect. 1.39.1-5, n. 27 (17:487); English translation, Contingency and 
Freedom. Lectura I 39, ed. A. Vos Jaczn and others, The New Synthese 
20 Faith and Philosophy 
Historical Library, 42 (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer, 1994), p. 82. 
11. Glossing "merely secundum quid existence" as "potential existence" is 
clearly required here by the context. Scotus' example is the (non-existent) 
space outside a finite but continuously expanding universe. The point of the 
rather awkward example is that any such space exists potentially, such that it 
will exist actually when the expanding universe "reaches" it. Just the same 
gloss as that which I am suggesting is offered in the dubiously authentic 
Ordinatio account: see Ord. 1.39.1-5, n. 9 (6:409). 
12. (A'.I) is found in Scotus' late Reportatio Parisiensis, the examined 
reportation of Scotus' Parisian lectures on the Sentences made soon after 1305 
(for the reference, see Allan B. Wolter, "Scotus' Paris Lectures on God's 
Knowledge of Future Events," in The Philosophical Theology of John Duns 
Scotus, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams [Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1990], p. 288; for the date, see Balie, Les commentaires, pp. 25-33). (It is 
also present in the dubiously authentic Ord. 1.39.1-5, n. 9 [6:409].) The pres-
ence of (A'.I) in the Reportatio Parisiensis, so late in Scotus' oeuvre, is puz-
zling. I shall, I hope, provide good reasons in this paper for the claim that 
Scotus should, for reasons of consistency, have rejected (A'.I). 
13. Lect. 1.39.1-5, n. 28 (17:487); Vos Jaczn, p. 82. lowe the formulation of 
some of these claims to Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols, 
Publications in Medieval Studies, 26 (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1987),2:1122. Adams formulates my (D) as "Only temporally 
present things are absolutely actual," presumably on the basis of Ord. 1.39.1-
5, n. 9 (6:410, lines 1-3), where it is cryptically argued that, if some item has 
existence in itself ("in se") with respect to the first cause, then it will follow 
that it has existence absolutely ("simpliciter"). 
14. Adams, William Ockham, 2:1124. 
15. Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents, p. 
130. 
16. On Scotus' account, accepting Aquinas' claims would not, however, 
have any implications for God's knowledge of future contingents. 
According to Scotus, God's knowledge of future contingents is to be 
accounted for by his being a (partial) cause of all future contingent events. 
On this, see Wolter, "Scotus' Paris Lectures on God's Knowledge of Future 
Events"; also, on divine co-causality, William A. Frank, "Duns Scotus on 
Autonomous Freedom and Divine Co-Causality," Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology, 2 (1994): 142-64, and the literature cited there. 
17. Scotus rejects the flowing "now" as an explanation of the A-series on 
the Aristotelian grounds that it is impossible for an indivisible to undergo 
local motion. Aristotle's main reason for this claim is that 
(a) Any item moving continuously will necessarily traverse a 
distance smaller than itself before traversing distance equal to or 
greater than itself 
(Physics 6.10 [241a6-14], cited in Scotus, Ord. 2.2.1.2, n. 99 [7:200-01]). (a) 
gains some plausibility if we bear in mind that an item which fails to satisfy 
the stipulation in (a) looks like it will have to move in leaps. But it is difficult 
to think of some non-arbitrary reason why (a) should obtain in the case of 
an item of zero extension, since what (a) aims to guarantee is just that 
(~) There is no smallest distance which a continuously moving 
item must first traverse. 
SCOTUS ON ETERNITY AND TIMELESSNESS 21 
Clearly, in the case of an extended item, satisfying (a) is a necessary 
(though not sufficient) reason for satisfying (/3). But this is not so in the case 
of a non-extended item, and Aristotle's invoking (a) to prove that a non-
extended item cannot move continuously is just question-begging. Scotus 
elsewhere sees this clearly (see for example Ord. 2.2.2.5, n. 424 [7:342-43]): 
but he fails to see that it could be used to solve the paradox of a flowing 
"now." Craig criticizes the account of Scotus on time found in C. R. S. 
Harris, Duns ScotU5, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927),2:129-44, for fail-
ing to take account of the texts cited by Craig, containing (A'.1) and (A'.2) 
(see The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge, pp. 259-60, n. 12). In fact, although 
Craig cites arguments which are genuinely found in Scotus, he takes them 
from the dubiously authentic account printed as an appendix in the critical 
edition (Opera Omnia, 6:401-44). As I hope to show in a future article, much 
of what Harris has to say about Scotus on time is fundamentally correct: 
although this, too, is fortuitous, since he, like Craig, bases his account on an 
unauthentic text (the De Rerum Principio). Craig's criticism seems doubly 
misplaced. 
18. "Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio": 
Quod. 6, n. 14 (12:150), quoting Boethius, Cons. 5.6 (p. 101); English transla-
tion of Scotus' Quaestiones Quodlibetales published as God and Creatures. The 
Quodlibetal Questions, ed. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton and 
London: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 141 (par. 6.34). 
19. See also Ord. 1.9.un., n. 11 (4:333); Leet. 1.9.un., n. 8 (17:112). 
20. In addition to the texts cited in notes 18 and 19, see Ord. 2.1.3, n. 155 
(7:78). 
21. Ord. 2.2.2.5, n. 376 (7:321); Leet. 2.2.2.5-6, n. 374 (18:215). 
22. Ord. 2.1.3, n. 155 (7:78). 
23. Quod. 6, nn. 14-15 (12:150); Alluntis and Wolter, pp. 142-43 (par. 6.34-
35). 
24. Quod. 6, nn. 14-15 (12:150); Alluntis and Wolter, pp. 142-43 (par. 6.34-
35). 
25. Ord. 2.2.1.2, n. 101 (7:201-02). 
26. Quod. 6, n. 15 (12:150); Alluntis and Wolter, p. 143 (par. 6.35). 
27. "Voluntate antiqua potest fieri novus effectus sine mutatione volun-
tatis. Sicut ego volitione mea eadem continuata, qua volo aliquid fieri, faci-
am tunc illud pro 'quando' pro quo volo illud facere, ita Deus in aeternitate 
voluit aliquid aliud a se esse pro aliquo tempore et tunc illud creavit pro 
'quando' pro quod voluit illud esse": Ord. 1.8.2.un., n. 294 (4:322); see also 
Leet. 1.8.2.un., n. 274 (17:104). Scotus makes a related point at Ord. 2.1.2, n. 
86 (7:45). 
28. Ord. 2.1.2, n. 85 (7:72-73). 
29. "Nee enim voluntas eius impotens est, nee voluntas eius habet esse in 
tempore ut exspectet tempus pro quo producat voIitum: quod utique non 
vult tunc necessario esse quando vult, sed vult esse pro tempore determina-
to, quod tamen non exspectat, quia operatio voluntatis eius non est in tem-
pore": Ord. 1.8.2.un., n. 297 (4:324); see also Leet. 1.8.2.un., n. 277 (17:104-05). 
30. Ord. 2.2.1.1, nn. 34,53 (7:171-72, 180-81). 
31. See Richard Swinburne, "God and Time," in Reasoned Faith. Essays in 
Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 204-222. 
32. Scotus is happy to talk of "quasi-imaginary time" in the absence of 
any natural processes whatsoever: see Ord. 2.1.3, nn. 160-61 (7:80-81). The 
term appears to have two different meanings, only the first of which Scotus 
regards as legitimate. On the first meaning, imaginary time refers to the 
22 Faith and Philosophy 
temporal extension of a static created item. In this sense, it will have to 
mean much the same as the privative time which I discuss in note 33. On the 
second meaning, it is used by Scotus' opponent to refer to the temporal 
extension of a temporal God. Scotus makes it clear that he rejects this opin-
ion: "per te oportet Deum quievisse a causando a per infinitum quasi imagi-
natum": Ord. 2.1.3, n. 161 (7:81), my italics. 
33. Ord. 2.2.1.4, nn. 171-80 (7:231-35). An item which satisfied merely the 
second of these conditions is said by Scotus to be subject to "privative time." 
Privative time quite clearly entails temporal extension. Scotus likens priva-
tive time to a spatial vacuum, and supposes that there is distance between 
the boundaries of such a vacuum. I take it that Scotus would modify his 
claim that temporal extension is relative to change to include the claim that 
temporal extension is relative to actual or possible change. His account will 
thus bear some relation to the position labelled by Newton-Smith "modal 
reductionism," according to which "all assertions about time and the tempo-
ral aspects of things can be parsed as assertions about relations between 
actual and possible events" (W. H. Newton-Smith, The Structure of Time, 
International Library of Philosophy [London, Boston and Henley: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1980], p. 47). But there are some differences between 
Scotus' account and modal reductionism. Scotus does not hold that all 
assertions about time are reducible to assertions about relations between actu-
al and possible events, even though he holds that all assertions about time 
will entail corresponding assertions about actual and possible events. So let 
us label Scotus' position instead "modal relativism." 
34. Ord. 1.8.2.un., n. 229 (4:229). 
35. Ord. 2.1.4-5, nn. 200, 205 (7:101-04). For an excellent account of 
Scotus on real relations, see Mark G. Henninger, Relations. Medieval Theories 
1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 68-97. 
36. I have formulated (G) on the basis of Ord. 1.30.1-2, nn. 31, 39, 41 
(6:181-82, 185-88). 
37. Scotus frequently makes it clear that cognizing a real relation 
involves comparing one term to the other in the respect in which they are 
related. In the case of the merely rational relation of x to y, Scotus claims 
that the real relation between y and x is relevantly cognized in virtue of the 
cognizing agent's comparing x to y (see Ord. 1.30.1-2, nn. 39,41 [6:185-88]). 
38. Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 51 (6:192); see Henninger, Relations, p. 68, n. 4. 
39. Ord. 2.1.4-5, nn. 261-62 (7:129); see Henninger, Relations, p. 79. 
40. Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 41 (6:186). 
41. Ord. 1.30.1-2, nn. 30-31 (6:181-82). 
42. See Peter Geach, "What Actually Exists," in God and the Soul, Studies 
in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion (London and Henley, 1969), pp. 71-
72; also "Logic in Metaphysics and Theology," in Logic Matters (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1972), p. 322. 
43. Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 41 (6:186). 
44. "Cum dicitur 'Deus genuit,' consignificatur 'nunc' aeternitatis, ut sit 
sensus, Deus habet actum generationis in 'nunc' aeternitatis in quantum 
illud 'nunc' coexsistebat praeterito, - 'Deus generat,' hoc est habet actum 
generationis in 'nunc' aeternitatis in quantum coexsistit praesenti. Ex hoc 
patet quod cum illud 'nunc' vere coexsistat cuilibet differentiae temporis, 
vere dicimus de Deo differentias omnium temporum": Ord. 1.9.un., n. 17 
(4:336-37). 
45. "Quando comparantur duo ad tertium ... sequitur ex unione eorum 
in tertio, unio eorum inter se .... Ego sum cum aeternitate et Abraham fuit 
cum aeternitate, ergo simul sum cum Abraham": Ord. l.13.un., n. 83 (5:110); 
SCOTUS ON ETERNITY AND TIMELESSNESS 23 
see Lect. 1.l3.un., n. 30 (17:174-75). 
46. Ord. 1.l3.un., n. 83 (5:110); Lect. 1.l3.un., n. 30 (17:175). 
47. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," Journal of 
Philosophy, 78 (1981): 429-56 (ET-simultaneity is defined on p. 439); see also 
the slight modifications proposed by the same authors in "Eternity, 
Awareness, and Action," Faith and Philosophy, 9 (1992): 463-82. 
48. Stump and Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 435. 
49. "Sicut in aeternitate comparat voluntatem suam 'ut creativam' ad 
animam Antichristi ut possibilem pro aliquo tempore, ita comparat in aeter-
nitate voluntatem suam 'ut creantem' ad animam Antichristi ut actualiter 
exsistentem pro illo nunc pro quo vult creare illam animam: et istae quidem 
sunt duae relationes rationis": Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 41 (6:187-88), my italics in the 
translation. Scotus makes exactly the same point in Leet. 1.30.1-2, n. 48 
07:412-13). 
50. Ord. 1.35.un, n. 32 (6:258). Strictly speaking, according to Scotus 
here, only the former of these two relations (viz., the real relation in the crea-
ture) is required for God's cognizing a creature (see also Ord. 1.35.un, n. 21 
[6:253] and n. 49 [6:266]). Scotus seems to suppose otherwise in Ord. 1.30.1-
2, n. 15, which I discuss below. 
51. "Deus posset cognoscere se creantem lapidem pro a; sed non posset 
noviter cognoscere se creantem lapidem, sed in aeternitate cognosceret se 
pro a creantem lapidem sicut in aeternitate cognoscit se pro aliquo tempore 
creativum lapidis. Hoc est dictu, in aeternitate cognoscit illam relationem 
actualem eius ad illud pro a, sicut et cognoscit relationem sui quasi poten-
tialem - rationis tamen - ad illud pro aliquo tempore": Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 42 
(6:188); see Leet. 1.30.1-2, n. 51 (17:413), also Leet. 1.39.1-5, n. 73 (17:504). The 
objection, which the reply fails to meet, is: "If there can be no new relation in 
God by an act of his intellect, then if ... God could create a stone, he could 
not know himself to be creating that stone in the way that a created intellect 
could know him (when he is creating [the stone]), to be creating the stone 
now. But the consequent is wrong, since whatever we can know, [God] can 
know much more" ("Si nulla potest esse relatio nova in Deo per actum intel-
lectus sui, ergo si ... Deus posset creare lap idem, non posset intelligere se 
creantem lapidem, sicut intellectus creatus potest intelligere ipsum modo 
creantem lapidem, quando ipsum creat; consequens videtur inconveniens, 
quia quidquid est cognoscibile a nobis, multo magis et ab ipso"): Ord. 1.30.1-
2, n. 42 (6:188). That Scotus should see the need to raise this objection is 
strong evidence in favor of the claim that Scotus' God is timeless and knows 
things timelessly: and his failure to give a satisfactory reply is even stronger 
evidence. Scotus replies in terms merely of God's knowledge of the B-series, 
which is hardly problematic for a defender of divine timelessness. 
52. Elsewhere, Scotus calls the quasi-potential rational relation an "apti-
tudinal" relation (see Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 15 [6:174]). 
53. Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 15 (6:174). Accepting (J) looks to be inconsistent with 
Scotus' claim, discussed in note 50 above, that God could in principle have 
knowledge of a creature (such that there would be a real relation in the crea-
ture to God) without there being a corresponding rational relation in God. I 
do not know how to reconcile these two Scotist claims. 
54. Scotus takes this view against Henry of Ghent, who holds 
(J*) Divinely caused rational relations in God to a creature neces-
sarily correspond on a one to one basis with God's creative actions. 
On (J*), if there is just one divine action with regard to a creature e, there 
24 Faith and Philosophy 
will be just one rational relation between God and c. Using the example of 
the Antichrist, Henry would argue that there is just one divinely caused 
rational relation in God to the Antichrist, since there is just one creative act 
bringing it about that the Antichrist exists (Henry of Ghent, Quod. 9.1 ad 1 
[pp. 13-14]; see Scotus, Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 11 [6:172]). One advantage of Scotus' 
position is that it allows God to have some kind of knowledge of the truth 
values of tensed propositions. This is because, on Scotus' account, God will 
be able to compare his essence to two different real creaturely relations. 
Thus, supposing that the Antichrist begins to exist at some time t, Scotus 
argues what is known by God in (y) and (3) represent two separate items of 
knowledge: 
(y) God knows that "the Antichrist exists" is true at t; 
(3) God knows that "the Antichrist will exist" is true at t -=!I. 
On the other hand, although Scotus' odd position here is sufficient to 
allow that (y) and (3) fail to be synonymous, it is easy to imagine more eco-
nomical theories which could allow for this. 
55. Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 15 (6:172); see Ord. 1.30.1-2, n. 41 (6:186-88). 
56. Quod. 6, n. 15 (12:150); Alluntis and Wolter, p. 142 (par. 6.35). 
57. "Sed quid significant ista verba diversorum temporum, cum dicun-
tur de Deo? - Respondeo. Magis proprie possunt dici consignificare 'nunc' 
aeternitatis quam differentias temporis; nec tamen illud 'nunc' absolute, 
quia non esset tunc variatio modorum diversorum temporis significandi sed 
in quantum coexsistit partibus temporis, ut cum dicitur: 'Deus genuit,' con-
significatur 'nunc' aeternitatis, ut sit sensus, Deus habet actum generationis 
in 'nunc' aeternitatis in quantum illud 'nunc' coexsistebat praeterito, -
'Deus generat,' hoc est habet actum generationis in 'nunc' aeternitatis in 
quantum coexsistit praesenti. Ex hoc patet quod cum illud 'nunc' vere coex-
sistat cuilibet differentiae temporis, vere dicimus de Deo differentias omni-
um temporum": Ord. 1.9.un., n. 17 (4:336-37). The version of (A'.I) found in 
Ord. 1.39.1-5, n. 9 (6:409) blurs the distinction between presence and coexis-
tence, and crucially claims both that coexistence is a real relation and that 
God does not coexist with his creatures: "Aeternitas non erit ratio coexsis-
tendi alicui nisi existendi." This doctrine is decidedly un-Scotist, and seems 
to me clear evidence in favor of the unauthenticity of the text at this point. 
58. Quod. 13, n. 11 (12:311); Alluntis and Wolter, p. 292 (par. 13.34). 
59. In his discussions of God's knowledge, Scotus does not seem to 
notice this. He consistently claims that God's knowledge of his creatures is 
logically and causally prior to the existence of these creatures, and thus that 
it is unaffected by the existence of his creatures (see for example Ord. 1.2.1.1-
2, nn. 105, 107-08 [2:187-88]; English translation in Duns Scotus, Philosophical 
Writings, ed. Allan B. Wolter [Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1987], 
pp. 60-61). Even supposing that God's knowledge is causally prior to his 
creatures, my second objection will stand. 
60. Scotus consistently distinguishes between relational and absolute 
items. A relational item - i.e., a relation - is "a condition 'toward anoth-
er'" (Ord. 2.1.4-5, textus interpolatus [7:122]; see also Henninger, Relations, p. 
83, n. 40, and the texts cited there). This covers the first disjunct in (M). An 
absolute item is distinguished from a relation in virtue of the fact that the 
ratio of an absolute item does not include reference to any other item. Scotus 
argues, however, that all created absolute items necessarily depend on God. 
Since they cannot exist without this dependence, they are really identical 
SCOTUS ON ETERNITY AND TIMELESSNESS 25 
with it (Scotus accepts that separability is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for real distinction: see Ord. 2.1.5, nn. 200-04 [7:101-03]). But the crea-
ture and its dependence relation are formally or definition ally distinct, since 
dependence on God is not a defining feature of any creature (Ord. 2.1.4-5, nn. 
272-75 [7:135-361; see also Henninger, Relations, pp. 78-85). This covers the 
second disjunct in (M). The disjunction in (M) is exhaustive, since Scotus 
defines an absolute item as one which does not require any other item for its 
existence (Ord. 2.1.4-5, textus interpolatus [7:122]). An act of knowledge is not 
formally a relative item. It does, however, require a relation in itself to its 
object for its existence (Quod. 13, nn. 3-5, [12:302-031; Alluntis and Wolter, 
pp. 285-87 [par. 13.8-13.16]). It is thus an instance of the second disjunct in 
(M) (Quod. 13, nn. 8, 11 [12:309, 3111; Alluntis and Wolter, pp. 290, 292 [par. 
13.27, 13.34]). 
61. Physics 4.10 (217b32). 
62. Physics 4.10 (217b33-218a3). 
63. Richard Sora bji, Time, Creation and the Continuum. Theories in 
Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 13: my 
italics. 
